Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 IO-13 ACDA-12 /084 W

-----034060 262006Z /43

R 260801Z JAN 78

FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6564

INFO AMEMBASSY WARSAW

AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMCONSUL BREMEN

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E.O. 11652: GDS TAGS: PGOV, GE, GW

SUBJECT: FRG - GDR RELATIONS

1. SUMMARY. A WISCHNEWSKI VISIT TO EAST BERLIN IS LIKELY; INNER-GERMAN TALKS AT THE GAUS LEVEL WILL CONTINUE DESPITE THE SPIEGEL FLAP; AND NO MAJOR CHANGE CONFIDENTIAL

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IN THE FRG DOMESTIC POLITICAL SCENE IS LIKELY OVER THE NEXT YEAR, ACCORDING TO GDR MFA FRG SECTION CHIEF SEIDEL. THESE WERE THE MAIN CONCLUSIONS FROM A MEETING THE DCM HAD WITH SEIDEL JAN. 24. END SUMMARY.

2. WISCHNEWSKI VISIT. WHILE NOT EXPLICIT ABOUT WHEN A WISCHNEWSKI VISIT TO EAST BERLIN WOULD TAKE PLACE,

SEIDEL SAID THE TIMING AND THE LEVEL OF THE GDR LEADER-SHIP WITH WHOM WISCHNEWSKI WOULD MEET WERE UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDERATION. HE LEFT LITTLE DOUBT THAT HE FAVORED SUCH A MEETING AND THAT IT WAS A MATTER OF WORKING OUT THE DETAILS, ADMITTEDLY IMPORTANT IN THE CURRENT POLITICAL CONTEXT. (SINCE THE TALK WITH SEIDEL TOOK PLACE ON TUESDAY, WHEN THE SED POLITBUREAU PRESUMABLY WAS DISCUSSING THE MATTER, IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT SEIDEL COULD OR WOULD WANT TO BE MORE PRECISE ABOUT SUCH A MEETING.) NOTING THAT THE INITIATIVE FOR SUCH A MEETING HAD COME FROM THE FRG SIDE. SEIDEL EXPRESSED REGRET THAT A LEAK ABOUT IT HAD OCCURRED, ADDING RUEFULLY THAT THE WEST GERMANS WERE HOPELESS ABOUT KEEPING SUCH MATTERS CONFIDENTIAL. SEIDEL EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT A WISCHNEWSKI MEETING WOULD RESTORE THE SITUATION TO THE POINT THAT THE NORMALIZATION PROCESS BETWEEN THE TWO STATES COULD CONTINUE.

3. SEIDEL ASSERTED THAT THE "NECESSARY PRECONDITIONS" AND "NEW IMPULSES" WOULD HAVE TO BE PRESENT FOR A WISCHNEWSKI VISIT. WHEN ASKED WHAT THESE WERE, HE SAID NECESSARY PRECONDITIONS WOULD INCLUDE A MORE RESPONSIBLE FRG PRESS TREATMENT OF THE GDR AND INNER GERMAN MATTERS, AND A MORE RESPONSIBLE BONN GOVERNMENT ATTITUDE. SEIDEL SAID HE KNEW ALL THE ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN THE FRG AND THE LIMITED CONFIDENTIAL

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ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT, BUT FELT SOME GREATER SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY MUST BE SHOWN BY THE FRG PRESS, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO TREATMENT OF GDR LEADERS. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE JAN. 19 SPEECH BY CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT IN THE BUNDESTAG REPRESENTED A POSITIVE GOVERNMENT ATTITUDE AND NOTED THAT THE EXTENSIVE REPORTING IN THE EAST GERMAN PRESS WAS INTENDED AS A POSITIVE SIGNAL FROM THE EAST GERMAN SIDE. WITH RESPECT TO "NEW IMPULSES", SEIDEL MENTIONED BRIEFLY A MORE RESPONSIBLE BONN ATTITUDE WITH RESPECT TO THE ELBE RIVER BORDER ISSUES AND PERHAPS FURTHER INDICATIONS OF FRG WILLINGNESS TO BE FORTHCOMING IN ECONOMIC MATTERS.

4. THE SPIEGEL AFFAIR. IN REVIEWING THE CURRENT STATE OF INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS, SEIDEL RAISED THE SPIEGEL ARTICLES, WITHOUT HOWEVER REFERRING TO THEM AS A MANIFESTO OR THE CONTENT OF THE ARTICLES THEM-SELVES. THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE GDR ACTION WAS THAT THE GDR SIMPLY COULD NOT TOLERATE AN ATTACK AGAINST THE HEAD OF STATE, AND SEIDEL ASSERTED THAT THERE WAS A SIMILAR LAW IN THE FRG. HE CLAIMED THE GDR DECISION TO CLOSE THE SPIEGEL OFFICE WAS NOT AN

EXAGERATED CCEZWNCPWDDKPQMVZZUPJYSBND WARNED THE SPIEGEL OFFICE HERE AFTER THE APPEARANCE OF THE FIRST ARTICLE ABOUT POSSIBLE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES. SEIDEL WENT ON TO CLAIM THAT, FROM THE GDR VIEW, CERTAIN CIRCLES IN THE FRG WISHED TO BLOCK THE NORMALIZATION PROCESS AND THAT THE SPIEGEL ARTICLES WERE THE LATEST AND MOST EGREGIOUS EXAMPLE OF THESE EFFORTS. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE CITED THE FEBRUARY 1977 KARLSRUHE COURT DECISION ON THE ELBE RIVER BOUNDARY AND THE SEPTEMBER 1977 COURT DECISION ON THE VALIDITY OF

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R 260801Z JAN 78

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CONTRACTS TO HELP EAST GERMANS TO ESCAPE AS EXAMPLES OF EFFORTS BY THESE CIRCLES TO SLOW DOWN THE NORMALIZATION PROCESS. HE ALSO COMPLAINED, BUT NOT VIGOROUSLY,

THAT OFFICIAL BONN REPRESENTATIVES HAD SUPPORTED, BY PUBLIC STATEMENTS, THE SPIEGEL IN RESPONSE TO THE GDR DECISION TO CLOSE THEIR OFFICE HERE. HE NOTED THAT ONLY HERBERT WEHNER HAD SPOKEN OUT IN CLAIMING THAT CONFIDENTIAL.

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THE SPIEGEL ARTICLES WERE A PURE FABIRCATION.

5. INNER-GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS. AFTER MAKING THESE POINTS, SEIDEL REVIEWED THE VARIOUS NEGOTIATIONS THAT WERE UNDER WAY BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. HE SAID THE BORDER COMMISSION WAS MEETING THAT DAY IN NUERNBERG, AND EXPRESSED SOME OPTIMISM THAT THE REMAINING ISSUES, I.E. THE DELIMITATION OF THE BORDER ALONG THE ELBE RIVER IN LOWER SAXONY AND THE FORM OF AN AGREEMENT, COULD BE WOUND UP BY THE MIDDLE OF THIS YEAR. IN NOTING THE TWO REMAINING ISSUES, SEIDEL REITERATED THAT THE BORDER ALONG THE ELBE COULD NOT BE ON THE GDR SIDE AND THAT THE FORM OF THE UNDERSTANDING COULD BE EITHER A GOVERNMENT "PROTOCOL" OR "AGREEMENT". IN EXPRESSING OPTIMISM ABOUT SOLVING THIS ISSUE, SEIDEL WENT ON TO SAY THAT ONCE AN AGREEMENT IS SIGNED. A JOINT COMMISSION WILL BE FORMED TO REGULATE THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS ALONG THIS BORDER AS THEY ARISE.

6. ON NEGOTIATIONS FOR A VETERINARY AGREEMENT,
SEIDEL SAID BOTH SIDES WOULD MEET AGAIN IN FEBRUARY.
NOTING THAT THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS
WERE LARGELY TECHNICAL AND HARDLY EARTHSHATTERING,
HE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT ONE COULD NOT AND SHOULD
NOT OVERLOOK THE POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF SIGNING SUCH
A TECHNICAL AGREEMENT. ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENT,
SEIDEL SAID THE QUESTIONS WERE COMPLICATED, BUT THAT
THE EXPERTS WERE CONTINUING TO TALK. HE INDICATED
THAT THE RESOLUTION OF TECHNICAL ISSUES INVOLVED,
I.E. HOW TO DEAL WITH WAST WATERS, FROM THE POTASH
MINES, WOULD COST BOTH SIDES A LOT OF MONEY. WITH
RESPECT TO THE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AGREEMENT, HE
REITERATED THAT VIRTUALLY EVERYTHING HAD BEEN COMPLETED
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BUT THERE WAS STILL THE QUESTION OF HOW WEST BERLIN WOULD BE TREATED. HE INDICATED, AS HE HAS DONE BEFORE, THAT ONCE THE SOVIET-FRG AGREEMENT IS SIGNED THERE SHOULD BE NO PROBLEM IN REACHING FINAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN BONN AND EAST BERLIN. HE SAID THERE WAS NO

MOVEMENT ON A CULTURAL AGREEMENT BECAUSE BOTH SIDES HAVE "MORE PRESSING PROBLEMS"TO DISCUSS AT THE PRESENT TIME. FINALLY, HE ALSO INDICATED THAT BOTH SIDES WERE TALKING ON THE QUESTION OF THE HERLESHAUSEN-WARTHA CROSSING POINT AND THAT THERE WOULD BE DISCUSSIONS THIS YEAR ON THE BERLIN-HAMBURG AUTOBAHN.

- 7. FRG DOMESTIC SCENE. ASKED TO GIVE HIS ASSESSMENT
 OF THE FRG DOMESTIC POLITICAL SCENE, SEIDEL SAID IT
 WAS HIS PERSONAL VIEW THAT CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT WAS
 FIRMLY IN THE SADDLE AND THAT THE CDU-CSU HAD NO
 ATTRACTIVE PERSONALITIES OR PROGRAMS FOR FRG VOTERS.
 HE DISCOUNTED THE LIKELIHOOD THAT UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS,
 THE STRAUSS AND POULLAIN AFFAIRS, OR A REEMERGENCE OF
 TERRORISM WOULD CAUSE ANY MAJOR POLITICAL PROBLEMS
 FOR THE GOVERNMENT.
- 8. WITH RESPECT TO THE UPCOMING LAND ELECTIONS, SEIDEL EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THESE WOULD RESULT IN THE SPD MAINTAINING ITS LEGISLATIVE MAJORITY. IN HESSEN, WITH THE CHANGE OF THE MINISTER PRESIDENT THERE, IT WAS MORE LIKELY NOW THAN IN THE PAST THAT THE SPD WOULD EMERGE VICTORIOUS. IN LOWER SAXONY, SEIDEL THOUGHT IT LIKELY THAT THE CDU WOULD CONTINUE TO REMAIN IN POWER (WITH ALL THAT THIS MEANT FOR POSSIBLE COMPLICATIONS ON THE BORDER ISSUE), AND THAT THE FDP WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO PLAY MUCH OF A ROLE. IN HAMBURG,

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HE EXPECTED THE SPD WOULD WIN WITH AN INCREASED MAJORITY OVER ITS CURRENT LEVELS. FINALLY, IN BAVARIA IT WAS A FOREGONE CONCLUSION THAT STRAUSS WOULD WIN, BUT THE QUESTION WAS WITH HOW LARGE A MAJORITY. SEIDEL ACKNOWLEDGED THAT INNER GERMAN RELATIONS HAD ALWAYS BECOME AN ELECTION ISSUE, BUT EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THIS COULD BE AVOIDED THIS TIME AROUND. CONFIDENTIAL

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9. COMMENT. SEIDEL'S VIEWS, WHILE NOT STARTLING, ARE NOTEWORTHY IN THAT HE DID NOT DISCOUNT THE LIKELIHOOD OF A WISCHNEWSKI VISIT IN WHAT APPEARS TO BE AN EFFORT BY BOTH SIDES TO MODERATE THE EFFECTS OF THE SPIEGEL AND KOHL INCIDENTS. IT ALSO SEEMS EVIDENT THAT WHATEVER INTERNAL PRESSURES THERE MIGHT BE IN THE GDR AS A RESULT OF THE SPIEGEL AFFAIR, THE EAST GERMANS WILL SEEK TO PUT THE WEST GERMANS ON THE DEFENSIVE IN AN EFFORT TO EXTRACT CONCESSIONS FROM THEM AS THE PRICE FOR MOVING AHEAD TOWARD NORMALIZATION. BOLEN

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X Capture Date: 01 jan 1994 Channel Indicators: n/a

Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Concepts: FOREIGN RELATIONS, NEGOTIATIONS, PROGRESS REPORTS

Control Number: n/a Copy: SINGLE Draft Date: 26 jan 1978 Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960 Decaption Note: Disposition Action: RELEASED Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW

Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014 Disposition Event: Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978BERLIN00586
Document Source: CORE

Document Unique ID: 00 Drafter: n/a

Enclosure: n/a Executive Order: GS Errors: N/A

Film Number: D780039-0558 Format: TEL

From: BERLIN

Handling Restrictions: n/a Image Path:

Expiration:

ISecure: 1

Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780121/aaaaaror.tel

Line Count: 317 Litigation Code IDs: Litigation Codes:

Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

Message ID: 604a09e0-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc

Office: ACTION EUR

Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a

Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a

Reference: n/a Retention: 0

Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED Review Content Flags:

Review Date: 31 mar 2005 Review Event: Review Exemptions: n/a **Review Media Identifier:**

Review Release Date: n/a Review Release Event: n/a **Review Transfer Date:** Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a

SAS ID: 3712787 Secure: OPEN Status: NATIVE

Subject: FRG - GDR RELATIONS TAGS: PGOV, PEPR, GC, GE

To: STATE Type: TE

vdkvgwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/604a09e0-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc

Review Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

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